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Mr. Robert Amory prefaced his comments on the Soviet Union and its objectives and policies by referring to the two aspects of the limited war and the confrontation of atomic power may look from Moscow:

1. to moves today by us to increase our limited war capabilities and
2. to specific situations in which these enhanced capabilities might be used.

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This estimate of these aspects depends upon this evaluation of the contemporary U.S.S.R. and its future within the next twenty years. In making such an evaluation, there are two premises: 1) nuclear, general war is unthinkable; the Soviets are convinced of the appalling destruction which would result and reached this conclusion more fully and swiftly and 2) that peace -- in the minimum sense of the word as the absence of open warfare -- is to their advantage; they have about completed the gigantic job of building their economy. After the losses of the war the last conflict. (World War II) "cost two five-year plans;" by mid-1970's their industrial productivity curve will cross our own; why should they alter these conditions? They are fully confident. Yet they remain watchful and suspicious of us and will not, therefore, let their guard down.

The Soviets demonstrated this suspicion when in June, 1953, their troop deployments at the time of the Berlin riots were to defensive positions against an expected allied attack. They were convinced we had pulled the riots off as a prelude to war. A somewhat similar situation occurred in the Tonkin Delta when we appeared to be spoiling for a fight. Our attitude towards the offshore islands also appears to be a provocation by us to clear the Soviet junior partner.

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Soviet military forces appear to be soundly conceived with tremendous chances taken on untested models; this has been particularly apparent in the aircraft they are producing: a B-52 type comparable to ours was produced in four years; it took us eight years. IL28 jet light bombers total some six thousand compared with our few hundreds. Nevertheless we ~~very much~~ exaggerate the percentage of their effort in military fields. They did reduce their forces by 640,000 and now have some 3,500,000 in forces while we have some 2,900,000. They have 1.6 per cent of their population in forces, we have 1.8 per cent. The idea of Russia being a nation in arms held back by the A-Bomb is ridiculous. Their submarine fleet is four times our own; if we did not win an air war they would dominate the Northern Pacific. But in a world-wide sense they do not threaten us.

We are overly concerned with an attack upon Europe, as well as with peripheral aggression. In the last decade Korea was the only case of overt Soviet aggression; it was a miscalculation on the part of the U.S.S.R., and they realize that victory would not come cheaply. Indochina is utterly irrelevant; in early 1954, the highest estimate of Chinese aid to North Vietnam was only 3,000 tons a month of materiel, the equivalent of one liberty ship load every ninety days. On the contrary, the Soviets have shown extreme wariness -- in Afghanistan, for example, -- and they could have done much more with the farther Laos or with East German rearmament than they have. Where is the likelihood of peripheral aggression? Possibly over the off-shore islands this spring (twenty-four hours after the Israeli take on the Syrians.); to the Communists such an operation would be the completion of a revolution, the achievement of a sovereign right. Such a move would not be regarded as expansion but restoration.

What would be the Soviet reaction if we raised the level of our forces? It would be a reaction of grave doubts as to the President's sincerity and what we have been saying about preventive war; the gains for us in raising the levels would not be worthwhile for the Soviets would ask why we were raising our forces. As for their reaction to specific crises -- such as a SAC base in Pakistan -- the Soviets might make a counter-move and pull a "Prague" in Kabul; if we supported an exile government and went in militarily their reaction would be sufficient to defeat us. They would move similarly if a coup should take place in a satellite. If our objective is to hold where we are, then the situation will remain as it is; if we try and nibble away then we will meet with a reaction for the Soviets are not going to be pushed around. The Soviets are concentrating intensively, not extensively, on the creation of economic power. They do want disarmament. The real problems are posed by economic development, not by U.S.S.R. bayonets. We have to recognize the gigantic American economy has a world role responsibility and is not for us to enjoy alone.

Mr. Kennan described this analysis as very realistic and penetrative. It is important to underscore the remark of Mr. Amory that the Russians emphasize the development of their own country and they take great pride in their accomplishments. With respect to such areas as Indochina we must acknowledge the Soviets are not responsible for everything; they are not supporting subversive elements there. With respect to the periphery, there is the source of tension and the remarks of Khrushchev are important. The assumption that Communist parties may now come into power by parliamentary means seems an acquiescence to "Titoism" in advance to a kind of left-wing power which is anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist, wary of the United States and not really fully under Moscow's dictation. Stalin would never have

accepted this, he thought in terms of general power. So if the regime has changed, with respect to the periphery, the Soviets will be content to settle for anti-Americanism or the elimination of American influence; complete Soviet domination is not needed. The Soviets would, for example, like to see this in South Asia.

Mr. Kennan and Mr. Amory agreed further that the Soviets are being even more subtle: saying, in effect, "get all the aid you can get from both sides" -- they are not saying you have to be for us or against us; no political or military alliances and not too much encouragement in coups by Communist parties, "go ahead and fight your own problems in parliamentary battles; we don't insist you remain a conspiratorial subversive group." This policy lessens the degree of making them puppets and also increases the danger of local Communist Parties being successful. This will be important to us if we cling to a strongly military posture; that was the only outcome -- if we do so our prestige is going to plummet. We have to settle for something "fuzzy."

Mr. Altschul asked if this is the policy and program, what does it portend for us in the world conflict; what lines of policy should we adopt?

Mr. Amory replied we still have some chips on our side. No area of the world has opted voluntarily for Communism. If we are willing to stand up and be counted on the humanitarian front as we have on the military, we can beat them hands down. Ultimately, we can look forward to a merger between the two systems. There is a great difference in attitude of many in the U.S.S.R. -- (development of a managerial group, etc.); we have to keep their system from taking over through our default and thereby isolating ourselves. Does the Soviet system "contain the seeds of its own destruction"? It will modify itself into more benign channels -- a welfare state is not at all impossible. Mr. Kennan said he was referring in his article to Stalin's policies and that Khrushchev and Co. are aware of Stalin.

Mr. Johnson said he knew these points had to be stated but that he had a real fear concerning our nuclear situation if the American people were to believe Mr. Amory and Mr. Kennan were right; their reaction to our military defenses would be catastrophic. We may run the danger of a unilateral disarmament scheme -- and it is essential we maintain our nuclear capabilities. Concerning economic assistance, Mr. Johnson expressed the fear that when we do participate in development programs we are charged with economic imperialism. How can we launch a non-military campaign and do it so we don't look imperialist? Mr. Franklin asked to what extent we could give other states the greater initiative in seeking the aid and setting their requirements.

Mr. Amory thought greater use of multi-national groups would help -- giving through the Colombo plan, for example, would help remove the curse. How can the Russians afford a large program? They are not making gifts but postponing payments and accepting "soft" credits. They are also accepting the idea of a rational division of labor -- if someone else can produce rice cheaper, well and good. They can give us a real challenge here; we have to do something about preserving our over-all national interests and stop California from growing rice.

Mr. Kissinger suggested that whatever might happen eventually about the two systems at the present moment they must act according to their best lights; with reference to aid, our problem has been one of political legitimacy. The Soviets have gained much from the promise of aid, we have gained little from its actuality; we have not developed a political legitimacy or framework in which aid might fit; in the Middle East, for example, the initial impact of economic aid will be unsettling. On the military side, the very fact the Soviets have a certain missile capability has an impact on the periphery even if that capability is never used. Mr. Amory thought the Soviets would resist coups in the satellite areas; Mr. Kissinger asked what our position would be if there were a coup in Iran?

Mr. Amory agreed no charitable "egg-head" program is useful. But relatively small amounts of aid behind a government such as India would be of significant help and avoid an extremist situation; \$200,000,000 a year might do it -- we have \$175,000,000 in military equipment in Matsu and Quemoy. Libya is holding us up to the tune of \$5,000,000 a year to keep its internal air line from the Soviets; on a per capita basis, this would be the equivalent of \$5,000,000,000 to India. Also long-range planning is essential: \$20,000,000 spread over 10 years may be far more useful than \$40,000,000 this year and may be nothing next year. Mr. Amory agreed that until we get proper safeguards, armaments must be matched. As for what would happen in Italy (sic) if Communists took over? We cannot let it go and it won't happen without a legitimate government in exile. We cannot attack a "popular front" and Italy might drift away through such a device.

Mr. Kennan, referring back to Mr. Johnson's question, said the American people must be given the whole story; if they won't support an arms program when the reasons for it are true, then what further course lies ahead? We should make an effort to persuade people we are keeping the weapons reluctantly. The weapons must not creep into our public posture. Concerning Mr. Amory's suggestion, we would do well to recompense every manufacturer "suffering" from our tariff policies and encourage trade through a governmental trading corporation with substantial capital and leeway. We should use our best brains in the process; lay off areas where blackmail is offered -- when that has come up, you have already lost.

Mr. Altschul noted the earlier comments that the Soviet Union has no intention of going to war and is full of confidence for the future; also that their system is being modified and may yet approach our own. If these remarks are true, why should we care about making an effort at all? Yet aren't there some basic values involved? Such as the relationship of the state to the individual? Do we want a world dominated by the Soviet system? How can we prevent this from taking place? Isn't there something else involved, something more fundamental than that implied in a race between two economic systems? We cannot ignore the fundamental, human values; there are these greater values at stake. We must look with misgivings on any further expansion.

Do we have to change our state of mind? Unless the challenge of values is recognized we are not going to respond in the economic domain. If we move from a military challenge and decide there is a challenge in human values and in

national values we shall have to reorganize our thinking and our methods -- a monumental task of self-criticism which we have not yet accepted.

Mr. Amory replied it is not just a race between Magnitogorsk and Gary; moral values are innate; each has had a great cultural past. The development Mr. Amory envisaged is one in which these things which were suppressed in the cult of hatred will reappear. If we can get through the iron curtain and not try to win everything at once, Mr. Amory was convinced the two systems will move together on a more fundamental level than the economic. More arguments in the Central Committee will lead to something like our House of Representatives and lead eventually to free elections. The breakdown of the Iron Curtain is not a disaster to America. If Harvard students live in Russia and Russian students live in Harvard, you would have the eventual prospect of two societies living together. Also, it is well to remember that our values are not found among all our associates.

Mr. Johnson supported Mr. Altschul's concern. If the trends are in that direction, as described by Mr. Amory, what is the point of an all-out effort on our part for the next fifty years? Mr. Amory replied it may not be necessary if we go at it in the right way. Unless another mad Czar -- a Stalin or another great miscalculation occurs, it may not be necessary. We have to sell the American people on adequate military preparedness but this does not mean we have to have unlimited superiority over Russian efforts. We could live with a mixture of the Bulganin-Eisenhower proposals for inspection. Mr. Smyth added that something in this line is better than nothing.

Mr. Kissinger reverted to his question of Iran. There are some areas we can't let go Communist. If the Tudeh Party takes over, we should have to react. Unless we are willing to do so we shall lose continuously -- the question is still relevant -- how far do we react? Mr. Franklin added we are very much less likely to have war when there is a real danger of both sides being wiped out. If we reduce power, particularly nuclear power, by half, then half, as Mr. Amory suggested, we would be returning to an earlier situation when the possible gains from war would not be ruled out by the possibility of national suicide.

Mr. Altschul asked if there were no place where vital American interests would be at stake and we would be obliged to go to war? Mr. Amory suggested any NATO country including West Germany. Mr. Altschul asked about the Middle East. Mr. Amory replied that the possibility of overt aggression is remote but that in such an event, a vital American interest would be at stake. But our response to an attack upon Syria, Iran or Turkey should be in limited war with every effort to contain it.

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